MEMO · TO readers evaluating a workshop or a speaker · RE Governance
Foundations of dependable agentic AI
Why engineering reliability into agentic systems depends on bounded task specifications and trajectory-level observability in production, not on how capable the underlying model is.
Terence Kok, Enterprise AI Strategist, Author, Keynote Speaker
The most common failure mode in agentic AI deployment is capability-led design: a system built around what the model can do, with controls retrofitted after the fact. Reliability depends primarily on the engineering controls placed around a model, not on the model's own capability, and a task only belongs to an autonomous agent if its success can be checked programmatically and the agent runs against a hard step and cost budget. Everything else is decision support, not automation.
Ten elements make up a specification-first architecture. A bounded task specification defines machine-checkable success criteria, explicit termination conditions, and a task contract covering input schema, side effects and cost budget before the agent runs. Closed-loop verification gives the system access to a deterministic checker, a compiler, a unit test, a constraint solver, so a plausible-sounding output can be distinguished from a correct one. Least-privilege authority scopes credentials to the task, with staged autonomy from autonomous reads through to human-confirmed irreversible writes, and an absolute boundary at operational technology and safety-instrumented systems that no autonomy tier crosses.
Every external input, including tool results, is treated as untrusted by default, structurally separated from instructions to prevent injection attacks. Trajectory-level observability logs every step, prompt hash, model version, tool call, arguments, result, latency and policy decision, because assurance requires a record, not a demo, and an incident can only be reconstructed from a log that was actually kept. Evaluation happens against known-correct trajectories with step-level scoring and adversarial test cases, not against whether the final answer merely looked right.
The remaining elements handle what happens when something goes wrong: checkpointed state, loop detection, spend ceilings and tested escalation paths that let a system degrade gracefully rather than fail silently, with deterministic conventional code handling routing, validation and sequencing so a model's judgment is reserved for the decisions that actually require it. The frameworks referenced, ISO/IEC 42001, the EU AI Act's Article 12, and comparable national standards, all converge on the same underlying requirement: a system has to be built to produce evidence of its own reliability, not just claim it.
Exhibit · Specification-first architecture
Ten elements, grouped by when they act
Reliability depends on the engineering controls placed around a model, not on the model's own capability.
| Phase | Element | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Before it runs | Bounded task specification | Machine-checkable success criteria, termination conditions, a task contract covering input schema, side effects and cost budget. |
| Closed-loop verification | A deterministic checker — compiler, unit test, constraint solver — that distinguishes plausible from correct. | |
| Least-privilege authority | Credentials scoped to the task, staged autonomy, with an absolute boundary at OT and safety-instrumented systems. | |
| While it runs | Untrusted input by default | Every external input, including tool results, structurally separated from instructions to prevent injection. |
| Trajectory-level observability | Every step, prompt hash, model version, tool call, arguments, result, latency and policy decision logged. | |
| Evaluation against known-correct trajectories | Step-level scoring and adversarial test cases, not whether the final answer merely looked right. | |
| When it fails | Checkpointed state | So a failed run can resume or roll back rather than restart blind. |
| Loop detection | Catches an agent repeating itself before it burns the budget finding out. | |
| Spend ceilings | A hard cost and step budget the agent cannot run past. | |
| Tested escalation paths | A system that degrades gracefully rather than fails silently. |
Reference
This piece is adapted for Praxora Lab from the original. Originally published at terencekok.com ›
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